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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF  
AMICUS CURIAE 
 
The statement of identity and interest of amicus is set forth in the 
Motion for Leave to File submitted contemporaneously with this brief.  
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
But for strikes committed when they were between 18 and 21 years 
old, Mr. Moretti, Mr. Nguyen, and Mr. Orr would not be serving life 
without parole sentences under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act 
(POAA).1 This Court could accept the artificial boundary of the eighteenth 
birthday and decide that because the strike offenses occurred when Mr. 
Moretti, Mr. Nguyen, and Mr. Orr were over 18 years of age, these 
individuals must serve life without parole—the harshest punishment under 
Washington’s criminal law. Or, this Court could again embrace emerging 
science to apply justice and recognize, as it did in State v. O’Dell, that the 
intrinsic nature of youth extends beyond the eighteenth birthday. 183 
Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). Because at least one of the strike 
offenses occurred when they were less culpable and therefore “less 
deserving of the most severe punishments,” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 58, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), Petitioners ask the 
                                                 
1 RCW 9.94A.555, 570; see also RCW 9.94A.030(35) (defining offender), (38) 




Court to determine that their punishment is disproportionate and therefore 
cruel, in violation of article I, section 14.  
Amicus presents three points highlighting that under article I, 
section 14, a categorical bar of youthful strikes—strike offenses 
committed between the ages of 18 and 21—is doctrinally sound.  First, 
courts and legislatures around the nation have responded to a growing 
body of science that the mitigating qualities of youth extend to at least 21 
years old,2 and this trend should inform the Court’s understanding of the 
categorical bar analysis. Second, just as individual proportionality review 
of persistent offender punishment under article I, section 14 encompasses 
all strikes, so must categorical proportionality review of persistent 
offender punishment—making salient Petitioners’ youth at the time of 
each strike. Third, characterization of recidivist schemes as punishment 
for only the last strike is inapposite in the context of proportionality 
review. Amicus discusses an inconsistency within this Court’s article I, 
section 14 persistent offender proportionality jurisprudence that reviews 
all strikes, yet characterizes recidivist schemes as punishment for only the 
last strike by citing State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932, 558 P.2d 236 (1976). The 
cases on which Lee relies for this rule are not grounded in proportionality 
                                                 
2 See generally Br. of Amici Curiae Washington Association of Criminal Defense 




analysis, and are instead decisions upholding early habitual offender 
statutes against challenges based on double jeopardy, due process, and ex 
post facto protections.  
ARGUMENT 
 
I. COURTS AND LEGISLATURES ACROSS THE COUNTRY 
ARE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE MITIGATING 
QUALITIES OF YOUTH EXTEND TO AT LEAST 21 
YEARS OF AGE, AND THIS TREND SHOULD INFORM 
THE COURT’S CATEGORICAL BAR ANALYSIS. 
 
Proportionality analysis asks whether the punishment is 
disproportionate to either the crimes or the class of offender. State v. 
Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, ¶ 28, 428 P.3d 343 (2018); Graham, 560 U.S. at 
59. While individual proportionality “weighs the offense with the 
punishment,” Bassett, 192 Wn.2d ¶ 28, categorical proportionality 
analysis “requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue 
in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the 
punishment in question.” Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 67). Here, the 
Petitioners ask the court to consider the categorical proportionality of the 
class of offenders3 serving life without parole based on one or more strike 
                                                 
3 The State contends in its supplemental briefs that the class of offenders is ill-
defined. Supp. Br. of Resp’t in Moretti at 15-16; Supp. Br. of Resp’t in Nguyen at 
18; Supp. Br. of Resp’t in Orr at 9-10. Petitioner Moretti defines the class as 
those serving life without parole based on one more strikes committed between 




offenses committed as a youth, from ages 18-21.4  
A categorical analysis consists of two prongs. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 
¶ 27. First, the Court considers national consensus with respect to the 
specific sentencing practice at issue. Id. Second, it requires this Court to 
exercise its independent judgment based on “‘the standards elaborated by 
controlling precedents and by the [c]ourt’s own understanding and 
interpretation of the [cruel punishment provision]’s text, history,…and 
purpose.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 61) (alternations in original). 
In these cases, that requires consideration of “‘the culpability of the 
offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with 
the severity of the punishment in question,’ and ‘whether the challenged 
sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.’” Id. ¶ 34 (quoting 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 67). Because the parties’ supplemental briefs cover 
the independent judgment prong in detail, amicus has taken care to not 
repeat those arguments, and instead provides additional argument on the 
national consensus prong. 
While the issue before the Court is the constitutionality of youth 
strikes (18-21) rather than juvenile strikes (under 18), the consensus 
against juvenile adjudications and juvenile strikes is relevant, as the brain 
                                                 
4 These three cases were stayed pending State v. Bassett, making the inclusion of 




science demonstrates that the same deficits are present in both age groups. 
See generally Br. of Amici Curiae Washington Association Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, et al. (explaining the emerging consensus in the 
scientific community that there are no meaningful psychological or 
neurobiological distinctions between those who fit the current definition of 
juvenile, and those who are between 18 and 21). Professor Beth 
Caldwell’s recent analysis of whether states with harsh recidivist statutes 
(allowing sentences from 15 years to life) permit the use of juvenile 
adjudications as prior convictions to enhance sentences under recidivist 
statutory schemes determined that such a national consensus exists. Beth 
Caldwell, Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes as 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. Rev. 581, 617-25 (2012).5   
While states’ approaches to the use of adult convictions of juvenile 
offenders as strikes vary more than the use of juvenile adjudications, 
Caldwell notes that there may be an “emerging national consensus against 
using adult convictions of juvenile offenders for sentencing 
                                                 
5 As of 2012, ten states, including Washington, RCW 9.94A.030(35), (38), have 
legislation that explicitly excludes the use of juvenile adjudications as prior 
convictions for three strikes sentencing. Caldwell, supra, at 619 n.240 (citing 
jurisdictions). Ten additional jurisdictions’ statutes “most likely prohibit the use 
of juvenile adjudications as strikes.” Id. at 619 n.241. Thirteen additional states 
appear to prohibit the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes through case law. 
Id. at 620 n.244. In total, as of 2012, thirty-three states most likely prohibit the 




enhancements.” Id. at 628; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 
125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (it is the “consistency of the 
direction of change” rather than a static examination of the law at any 
particular point that is relevant (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
315, 122 S. Ct. 2442, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002))). In 2012, Caldwell 
identified at least eight jurisdictions that “prohibit or limit the 
circumstances under which convictions of juvenile offenders in adult court 
may be used for future sentencing enhancement under three strikes laws.” 
Caldwell, supra, at 628 n.282.6 Since then, at least one state, Wyoming, as 
part of its Miller7 fix statute, not only eliminated juvenile life without 
parole, but also excluded convictions of juveniles in adult court from 
counting as strike offenses under its habitual offender statute. Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-10-201(b)(ii) (permitting life without parole for three strikes only 
after three or more previous convictions for “offenses committed after the 
person reached the age of eighteen (18) years of age.”); see also 2013 
                                                 
6 These eight jurisdictions break down into two categories. Kentucky, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oregon expressly limit or exclude the 
use of juvenile convictions as strikes. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.080(2)(b), 3(b); 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-7; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-23(C); N.D. Cent. Code § 
12.1-32-09; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.725. Alabama, New York, and Wisconsin 
do not allow the use of youthful offender convictions of juveniles in adult court 
as strikes. N.Y. Penal Law § 60.10; Ex parte Thomas, 435 So. 2d 1324, 1326 
(Ala. 1982); State v. Geary, 95 Wis. 2d 736, 289 N.W.2d 375, 1980 WL 99313 
(Ct. App. 1980). 




Wyo. Sess. Laws 75 (showing Miller fix along with revision to habitual 
offender statute).8 When Graham was decided, only six jurisdictions had 
prohibited JLWOP categorically, and another seven jurisdictions allowed 
JLWOP but only for homicide crimes. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62. 
In conducting the categorical bar analysis, amicus also encourages 
the Court to take note of significant court decisions and legislative action 
across the country that acknowledge that youth continues to diminish 
culpability through the early twenties. See, e.g., Cruz v. United States, No. 
11-CV-787 (JHC), 2018 WL 1541898 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (granting 
defendant’s habeas petition on the ground that Miller applies with equal 
force to 18-year-olds and rendered his mandatory life sentence 
unconstitutional); United States v. Walters, 253 F. Supp. 3d, 2017 WL 
2362644 (E.D. Wis. 2017) (imposing sentence of time served on 19-year-
old offender, which was below federal guidelines, in recognition of 
underlying brain science); In re Poole, 24 Cal. App. 5th 965 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2018) (vacating a parole board’s decision denying parole in light of 
inadequate consideration of age of 19-year-old offender); Order Declaring 
Kentucky’s Death Penalty Statute as Unconstitutional, Commonwealth v. 
Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559 (Fayette Circuit Court, 7th 
                                                 




Div. Aug. 1, 2017) (Scorsone, J.), review granted, No. 2017-SC-436 (Ky. 
Feb. 15, 2018) (declaring death penalty unconstitutional for those under 21 
years of age at the time of the offense, and relying on brain-science-related 
testimony of Dr. Laurence Steinberg, as individuals under 21 are 
categorically less culpable in the same way that Roper describes under 18 
year olds as less culpable); State v. Norris, No. A-3008-15T4, 2017 WL 
2062145 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 2017) (relying on Miller to 
support its decision to remand for resentencing a de facto life sentence 
imposed for murder committed by 21-year-old defendant); State v. Reyes, 
No. 9904019329, 2016 WL 358613 (Del. Super Ct. Jan. 27, 2016), 
reversed on other grounds by State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331 (Del. 2017) (on 
collateral review, vacating death sentence for trial counsel’s failure to 
explore and present the mitigating evidence concerning the qualities of 18 
year-old defendant’s youth).  
Legislative reform also reflects recognition of the diminished 
culpability of youthful offenders. California has provided youthful 
offender parole. A.B. 1308 (Cal. 2017) (amending Cal. Penal Code § 
3051, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id 
=201720180AB1308 (extending youth offender parole eligibility to those 
who committed offenses before age 25). Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, and 




offenders. Ala. Code §§ 15-9-1 to 15-19-7 (permitting courts to designate 
certain offenders under the age of 21 as “youthful offenders,” entitling 
them to a suspended sentence, a period of probation, a fine, and/or a term 
of incarceration not to exceed 3 years); Fla. Stat. § 958.04 (permitting 
alternative sentences for those under 21 at time of sentencing for any 
felony offense other than those carrying capital or life sentence, including 
supervision on probation, community custody, or incarceration not to 
exceed 6 years); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-667 (defining young adult 
defendant as under 22 that has not previously been convicted of a felony, 
and providing for specialized correctional treatment, community custody, 
individualized rehabilitative treatment, and/or sentencing to no more than 
8 years); Va. Code § 19.2-311 (providing for relief of those convicted of 
certain first-time offenses occurring before age 21, including giving courts 
discretion to sentence to an indeterminate period of incarceration of four 
years). And Washington has joined Vermont in expanding juvenile court 
jurisdiction. S. 234, 2017-2018 Sess. (Vt. 2018), https://legislature. 
vermont.gov/assets/Documents/2018/Docs/ACTS/ACT201/ACT201%20
As%20Enacted.pdf. As of February, four other jurisdictions had bills 
pending to expand juvenile court jurisdiction. Campaign for Youth Justice, 






Importantly, the determination of a national consensus is not 
dispositive. Bassett, 193 Wn.2d ¶ 33. And a consensus must always begin 
with one.  
II. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 ENCOMPASSES ALL STRIKES THAT FORM 
THE BASIS FOR RECIDIVIST PUNISHMENT.  
   
This Court must consider whether age categorically diminishes the 
culpability of the offenders at the time of each of the strikes in conducting 
a categorical proportionality analysis, as part of the exercise of its 
independent judgment. The consideration of all strikes is—and has been—
central to proportionality review of persistent offender punishment under 
article I, section 14 since State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 
(1980).9 In Fain, this Court considered the proportionality of a life 
sentence under the habitual offender statute in effect in 1980 by looking at 
the nature of “each of the crimes that underlies his conviction as a 
habitual offender” in determining whether Mr. Fain’s sentence violated 
the more protective article I, section 14. Id. at 397-98 (emphasis added) 
(citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 295, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 
                                                 
9 If this Court does not adopt the categorical approach to Petitioners’ claims, 
amicus urges the Court to expand the Fain factors to encompass the 




2d 382 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (considering each of the victimless 
crimes underlying a life without parole sentence)).  
 This Court’s more recent decisions in State v. Manussier, 129 
Wn.2d 652, 921 P.2d 473 (1996), and State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 
875, 329 P.3d 888 (2014), also reflect that proportionality analysis under 
article I, section 14 subjects each of the strike offenses to scrutiny, as well 
as the “qualifying” strike, in reviewing a sentence under the POAA. In 
Manussier, this Court’s proportionality analysis under article I, section 
1410 explicitly considered the two prior strikes in addition to the third 
strike before determining that the sentence was not disproportionate. 129 
Wn.2d at 485 (considering “each of the offenses underlying his conviction 
as a 'persistent offender” and that all three of his offenses were serious 
crimes (emphasis added)). 
In Witherspoon, before concluding that the life sentence was not 
disproportionate, the Court looked at the nature of the first two strike 
offenses (first degree burglary and residential burglary with a firearm). 
180 Wn.2d ¶ 27 (relying on the analysis in Manussier and Lee, where the 
                                                 
10 This Court also considered the prior strikes under its Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis. Id. at 484 (contrasting Mr. Manussier’s strike offenses 
as “far more serious” than the petitioners in Solem and Rummel, where the strike 
offenses were nonviolent property offenses (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 





Court had considered the prior strikes in conducting proportionality 
analysis of prior persistent offender punishments). The Witherspoon Court 
also suggested that the “differences between children and adults” 
recognized in Graham and Miller might have application in 
proportionality analysis under article I, section 14, based on the offender’s 
age at commission of “all three of his strike offenses.” Id. ¶¶ 29-31 
(emphasis added) (declining to apply Graham and Miller, because Mr. 
Witherspoon was an adult at the time of all three of his strike offenses).11  
While the substance of the individual proportionality analysis in 
these three cases is inapplicable to the categorical challenge here, Fain, 
Witherspoon, and Manussier demonstrate more generally that 
proportionality analysis under article I, section 14 encompasses all of the 
conduct that forms the basis for the life without parole sentence. The third 
strike is not considered in a vacuum.  
Federal decisions conducting proportionality analysis under the 
Eighth Amendment in persistent offender contexts also scrutinize all strike 
offenses.12 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296–97, 303, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 
                                                 
11 The opinion does not state whether any of Witherspoon’s strike offenses were 
committed between the ages of 18-21. 
12 The Fourth Circuit—the only circuit to date that has meaningfully considered 
the import of Graham and Miller on federal recidivist schemes under the federal 
sentencing guidelines—determined that a life sentence imposed under the de 
facto career offender provision of the federal sentencing guidelines was 




3013, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983) (life without parole imposed to punish the 
relatively minor criminal conduct underlying all strike offenses was 
disproportionate: “Helm’s status [as a recidivist]. . .cannot be considered 
in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all 
relatively minor”); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284 (persistent offender 
                                                 
occurred when the petitioner was a juvenile. United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 
519, 531-32 (4th Cir. 2014). The Howard court conducted a substantive 
reasonableness review, requiring courts to consider the “totality of the 
circumstances” by “proceed[ing] beyond a formalistic review of whether the 
district court recited and reviewed the 3553(a) factors [federal sentencing 
guidelines] and ensur[ing] that the sentence caters to the individual 
circumstances of a defendant.” Id. at 531 (citation omitted). The Howard court 
determined the district court erred by “focusing too heavily on Howard’s juvenile 
criminal history in its evaluation of whether it was appropriate to treat Howard as 
a career offender.” Id.; see also id. at 532 (relying on Graham and Miller to 
support its conclusion, given the diminished culpability of juvenile offenders).  
The other federal cases relied on by the State to argue that the age of the 
offender in earlier strike offenses is not material either did not engage in 
substantive reasonableness review, and/or simply avoided the issue of youth 
altogether by concluding that sentencing took place at the time the offender was 
an adult. See United States v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(declining to consider youth under substantive reasonableness review, because 
Roper and Miller did “not deal specifically—or even tangentially—with sentence 
enhancement” (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 
1009, 1018 (8th Cir. 2010) (rejecting individual proportionality argument, 
declining to engage in substantive reasonableness review, and declining to 
acknowledge the import of Roper and Graham, instead relying on United States 
v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002)—a case decided before Roper—that 
permitted juvenile court adjudications to enhance subsequent sentences for adult 
convictions); United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 457-64 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(declining to consider totality of circumstances in conducting reasonableness 
review and unpersuasively determining that Graham v. Florida does not apply 
because defendant was an adult at the time of the commission of the third strike 
offense); United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2006) (no substantive 
reasonableness review; declining to acknowledge applicability of Roper because 
there was no national consensus that sentencing enhancement based in part upon 




punishment is “based not merely on that person’s most recent offense but 
also on the propensities he has demonstrated over a period of time during 
which he has been convicted of and sentenced for other crimes,” but 
declining to find a life sentence based on nonviolent, petty property crimes 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 300 
(Powell, J., dissenting)13 (engaging in an individual proportionality 
analysis by analyzing each of the three crimes in concluding that “a 
mandatory life sentence for the commission of three nonviolent felonies is 
unconstitutionally disproportionate”).14  
III. THE STATE’S RELIANCE ON THORNE, LEE, AND 
LEPITRE TO FORECLOSE CONSIDERATION OF 
PREVIOUS STRIKES IGNORES THE CONTEXT AND 
DOCTRINAL ROOTS OF THE CITED LANGUAGE. 
 
There is, admittedly, a tension that exists in the language used by 
                                                 
13 Justice Powell’s Rummel dissent foreshadowed his majority opinion in Solem.  
14 Further, the availability of proportionality review under article I, section 14 in 
the persistent offender context is material to factor 4 of the parties’ Gunwall 
analysis. The preexisting Washington law demonstrates that the Court has 
subjected persistent offender punishment to proportionality analysis under article 
I, section 14, even where Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence has, 
at times, restricted itself to apply only to capital punishment. Rummel, 445 U.S. 
at 272 (“Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the 
proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”); Rummel, 
445 U.S. at 274 (“[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction by any 
decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as 
felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state 
penitentiary, the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of 
legislative prerogative.”). But see Solem, 463 U.S. at 286-90 (comprehensively 
discussing the Court’s proportionality jurisprudence to reaffirm that the Eighth 
Amendment guarantees proportionality between the crime and any criminal 




this Court in its past decisions in POAA and other habitual offender statute 
cases. Specifically, this Court has simultaneously recognized that 
proportionality review encompasses all strikes, Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 397-98 
(discussing each of the underlying crimes), while also pronouncing that 
Washington’s recidivist schemes punish the last strike only, State v. 
Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736, 776, 921 P.2d 514 (1996) (“The repetition of 
criminal conduct aggravates the guilt of the last conviction and justifies a 
heavier penalty for the crime” (quoting Lee, 87 Wn.2d at 937)).15 
Importantly, the context for this pronouncement in Thorne is the Court’s 
application of Fain factor 4 to determine if, as applied to Mr. Thorne, his 
punishment was disproportionate. The Court considered all of Mr. 
Thorne’s previous convictions. 129 Wn.2d at 775. In Lee, the Court 
likewise considered all of Mr. Lee’s offenses. 87 Wn.2d at 937, 937 n.4 
(discussing Mr. Lee’s prior convictions and finding sentence not 
disproportionate, and unlike the disproportionate sentence of a person 
whose “prior crimes were writing a check for insufficient funds and 
transporting a forged check across state lines”). These cases demonstrate 
that the Court examined not just the last offense but also the previous 
                                                 
15 This Court cited the identical language from Lee in Rivers, Manussier, and, 
more recently, in Witherspoon. State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 714-15, 921 P.2d 
495 (1996) (quoting Lee, 87 Wn.2d at 937); Manussier, 129 Wn.2d at 677 
(quoting Lee, 87 Wn.2d at 937); Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d ¶¶ 23-28 (quoting 




offenses in order to determine disproportionality. Thus, the State’s 
reliance upon Thorne and Lee to foreclose consideration of the previous 
strikes for Mr. Moretti, Mr. Nguyen, and Mr. Orr is misplaced.16 
Instead, the import of the language in Thorne and Lee referring to 
recidivist statutes as punishing only the last strike becomes apparent when 
one follows the citation chain. The Lee Court, citing State v. Miles, 34 
Wn.2d 55, 61-62, 207 P.2d 1209 (1949), rejected the proportionality 
argument in one sentencing, stating “[t]he life sentence…is not cumulative 
punishment for prior crimes. The repetition of criminal conduct aggravates 
the guilt of the last conviction and justifies a heavier penalty for the 
crime,” Lee, 87 Wn.2d at 239 (citing Miles, 34 Wn.2d at 61-62).  
However, a close examination of the Court’s sparse decision in 
Miles shows that the Miles Court conducted no proportionality analysis 
and upheld the habitual offender statute, citing the rules that habitual 
offenders “are not punished the second time for the earlier offense, but the 
repetition of criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies heavier 
                                                 
16 The State focuses on the language quoted in Lee without placing it in context, 
in an effort to contract the scope of proportionality review to only the last strike. 
Supp. Br. of State in Moretti at 14 (citing State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736, 776, 
921 P.2d 514 (1996) (quoting Lee, 87 Wn.2d at 937)); Supp. Br. of State in 
Nguyen, at 15 (citing identical rule from Lee) (quoting Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 776 
(quoting Lee, 87 Wn.2d at 937))); Supp. Br. of State in Orr at 6, 18 (citing a rule 





penalties when they are again convicted,” 34 Wn.2d at 62 (citing Graham 
v. W. Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623, 32 S. Ct. 583, 56 L. Ed. 917 (1912)), 
and that “punishment is for the new crime only,” id. (citing McDonald v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S. Ct. 389, 45 L. Ed. 
542 (1901)). The two cases cited by the Miles Court for this rule involved 
challenges to early habitual criminal offender statues under double 
jeopardy, due process, and ex post facto challenges. McDonald, 180 U.S. 
311 (rejecting a challenge to Massachusetts’s habitual criminal statute 
based on the double jeopardy and ex post facto provisions because the 
“punishment is for the new crime only, but is the heavier if he is an 
habitual criminal”; no Eighth Amendment challenge brought); Graham, 
224 U.S. at 623 (citing McDonald, 180 U.S. at 312-13) (rejecting a 
challenge to West Virginia’s habitual criminal offender statute under due 
process and double jeopardy, reasoning that habitual criminal offenders 
“are not punished the second time for the earlier offense, but the repetition 
of criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies heavier penalties 
when they are again convicted”).17   
                                                 
17 While the petitioner in Graham apparently argued that his sentence was cruel 
and unusual punishment, Graham, 224. U.S. at 623, the Court resolved it in one 
sentence, again relying on cases that did not involve Eighth Amendment 
proportionality challenges: “Nor can it be maintained that cruel and unusual 
punishment has been inflicted,” id. at 631 (citing Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 10 
S. Ct. 930, 34 L. Ed. 519 (1890) (rejecting challenge to New York’s statute 




Similarly, in an even earlier challenge to a habitual criminal 
statute, LePitre, 54 Wash. 166, 03 P. 27 (1909), the Court summarily 
dismissed claims based on double jeopardy, ex post facto, jury trial rights, 
or cruel and unusual punishment with a single sentence: “It [the habitual 
criminal statute] merely provides an increased punishment for the last 
offense.” Id. at 168 (citing secondary sources and In re Miller, 110 Mich. 
676, 68 N.W. 990 (1896)). The decision LePitre relies on, In re Miller, a 
two paragraph opinion, dismissed an ex post facto challenge to a Michigan 
statute providing that convicts with prior criminal history would not be 
entitled to a reduction in sentence for good behavior, whereas those 
without prior criminal history would. Id. at 676. The Miller Court found 
no ex post facto violation. Id. at 677. 
Thus, tracing the origins of the Lee and LePitre pronouncement 
reveals that these cases do not foreclose consideration of previous strike 
offenses. Instead, the context and history of Lee and LePitre simply 
reaffirm that recidivist statutes do not run afoul of due process protections 
or guarantees against double jeopardy or ex post facto laws. And more 
                                                 
Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676-77, 16 S. Ct. 179, 40 L. Ed. 301 (1895) 
(rejecting challenge to habitual criminal statute based on double jeopardy, 
reasoning that “[t]he increased severity of the punishment for the subsequent 
offense is not a punishment for the same offense for the second time, but a 
severer punishment for the subsequent offense, and rejecting the challenge based 




fundamentally to Petitioners’ cases, it is improper to rely on this 
pronouncement, as it has no place in proportionality review under article I, 
section 14.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Amicus asks this Court to apply what it recognized in O’Dell—that 
the same deficits of the juvenile brain are present beyond the artificial 
boundary of the eighteenth birthday. The culpability of those who commit 
strike offenses in their youth is inherently diminished, and therefore 
cannot be the basis for imposition of the harshest sentence now available 
in Washington. The most just and practical solution is to categorically bar 
strike offenses committed between the ages of 18 and 21 from counting as 
strikes under the POAA.  
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